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Consenting Employees: Workplace Privacy and the
Role of Consent
Steven L Willborn*
Privacy is about secrets. It protects our ability to keep
important parts of our lives secret. But even more than secrecy,
privacy is about autonomy. It protects our ability to choose which
parts of our lives to disclose to others. You would invade my
privacy if you analyzed my DNA, unless I gave you permission.
You would invade my privacy if you examined my e-mails at
work, unless I gave you permission. You would invade my
privacy if you inquired too closely into my sexuality, unless I
extended an invitation.
One way to think about this is to view consent as one of the
key limits on privacy. There is much in modem life, and
especially in modem work life, that is not private at all. But even
within the fairly limited realm of what privacy ordinarily protects,
the law will recognize less protection, if the individual agrees. The
possibility of consent provides a second, individualized, and
narrower limit to what the law protects as privacy.'
But the role of consent in privacy law is not merely, or evenly
principally, to serve as a limit. Consent is also an integral part of
what we understand privacy to be and one that makes important
contributions to the value of privacy in modem society. Consent is
a crucial component of privacy that empowers individuals and
affirms human dignity. It is consent that permits us to receive and
express intimacy. It is consent that regulates our respect for the
privacy of others. It is consent that bestows on individuals, rather
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Dean & Schmoker Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of
Law. My thinking on this topic has changed considerably based on feedback I
received during presentations at the University of Nebraska and LSU. I received
especially valuable comments from Bill Corbett, Rick Edwards, John Gradwohl,
Christine Jolls, Richard Moberly, Ramona Paetzold, Bob Schopp, Jane Willborn
and Bob Works. I would also like to thank the editors of the Louisiana Law
Review for the invitation that gave me cause to focus on this interesting issue,
and especially Sandra K. Varnado who did a spectacular job in organizing this
symposium. Finally, Stacey Hines provided solid and valuable research
assistance.
1. The focus of this paper is on consent to what would otherwise be
privacy violations. It certainly is possible to view consent more broadly so that
it can also expand privacy protections. Cf. Rulon-Miller v. International
Business Machine Corp., 208 Cal. Rptr. 524 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). But that is
not the topic of this article.
*
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than society, the power to draw the precise boundaries around their
own privacy.
Privacy does protect our secrets. But it functions primarily by
allocating authority over those secrets to individuals. Individuals
can continue to protect those secrets, or they can consent to their
release. Both privacy-as-secrets and consent mediate the boundary
between society and the individual. But consent, even more than
the concept of privacy-as-secrets, bows to the complexities of
modem life and affirms the power of individuals to shape their
own identities, their own lives.
The importance of consent in privacy law creates special
problems in the workplace. Everyone agrees that consent is a
difficult and compromised concept in employment law, although
the reasons vary. Some couch the problems in the rhetoric of
power: employee consent is suspect because employees are weak. 3
Others talk about various types of market imperfections that
compromise employee consent, such as asymmetric information or
free rider issues.4 Still others point to behavioral biases and
heuristics that taint employee consent. 5 But the bottom line is the
same: consent within the employment relationship is compromised
and must be regarded with at least some skepticism.
Thus, the tension that is the subject of this article. On the one
hand, consent is central to privacy in fundamental ways. On the
other hand, consent in the workplace is suspect and compromised.
I will begin in Section I by discussing in more detail the central
role of consent in American privacy law. In Section II, I will
analyze the current state of the law on employee consent to privacy
violations. In Section III, I will suggest several guidelines for
thinking about the appropriate role for employee consent.

2. I have come to agree with Peter Westen who claims that consent is a
"major concept by which we organize and express our normative judgments of
the world."
Peter Westen, The Logic of Consent: The Diversity and
Deceptiveness of Consent as a Defense to Criminal Conduct 293-94 (2004). As
a result, it ranks in importance with concepts such as justice, equality, freedom,
property and responsibility. Id. at 293.
3. See Matthew W. Finkin et al., Legal Protection for the Individual
Employee 2 (1989) ("[A]n appropriate function for [employment] law [is] to aid
the weaker party").
4. See Steven L. Willborn et al., Employment Law: Cases and Materials 59 (3rd ed. 2002).
5. See Cass R. Sunstein, Switching the Default Rule, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
106 (2002).
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PRIVACY AND CONSENT

Ruth Gavison provides a useful starting point for thinking
about privacy and consent. In a pathbreaking article, she identified
accessibility as the key element of privacy. Thus, perfect privacy
would exist when there was absolutely no accessibility: when no
one has any information about a person (secrecy), no one pays any
attention to her (anonymity), and no one has physical access to her
(solitude). 6
This is a useful starting point because it captures the situations
we associate with privacy and excludes others that might fall
within alternative definitions. Thus, the definition is sufficiently
broad to cover the situations I describe in the next section which
invoke privacy concerns. Having information about another's
DNA or HIV status raises concern about secrecy, while seeing
Steve Willborn without clothes (yes, that is about to come) would
raise concern about both anonymity and solitude. At the same
time, Gavison's definition is sufficiently narrow and precise to
exclude situations that might be covered by other, too-broad
definitions. Thus, as Gavison points out, thinking of privacy as
"being let alone" would cover things like requiring people to pay
taxes or join the army.7 Situations like these may well raise issues
relating to freedom and liberty, but they do not fit very well into
common or legal conceptions of privacy invasions.
Perfect privacy is, obviously, not a very desirable state.
Neither would its converse-a state of perfect lack of privacy-be
very desirable. We know from their reaction to paparazzi that even
the most public and publicity-craving people do not relish
situations in which everything is known about them (no secrecy),
everything they do is known no anonymity), and they are
constantly observed (no solitude). The interesting questions arise
between these two states when we attempt to identify the precise
points on this continuum where the law ought to provide
protection. (Figure 1) One contested place on the continuum
identifies social protection of privacy. At what point, absent
consent, would the law provide protection? The answer to this
question will vary depending on the particular type of privacy
(sexual, medical, educational records), the particular reasons for
6. Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 Yale L.J. 421, 428
(1980).
7. Id. at 437-38.
8. Id. at 443. See Americas Clampdown on Hollywood Paparazzi, BBC
News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/245760.stm (Jan. 1, 1999)
(describing California law supported by Hollywood celebrities which makes
certain paparazzi activities a misdemeanor) (last visited April 15, 2006).
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thinking that privacy might be warranted (freedom from ridicule,
promoting autonomy, promoting civility), the particular category
of privacy invasion at issue (intrusion on seclusion or solitude,
public disclosure of private facts, false light, appropriation), the
particular culture for which the rules are developed, and many
other factors. The bulk of the literature on privacy discusses the
location of this point. 9 This is an interesting issue, of course, but
not the topic of this paper. This paper accepts the point of social
protection wherever it might be.
Figure1
Perfect
Lack of
Privacy

Perfect
Privacy

I

I

A
Point of
Social Protection
The topic of this paper is about the space to the left of this
point. 10 Thus, the paper assumes that there is presumptive social
protection for the privacy at issue. But just what is it that is
protected in that space? It is almost always incorrect to think that
there is something in that space that is so secret that society forbids
its disclosure." Instead, what is protected in the space is the
9. See, e.g., Gavison, supra note 6; Robert C. Post, The Social
Foundationsof Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 Cal.
L. Rev. 957 (1989); Louis Henken, Privacy andAutonomy, 74 Columbia L. Rev.
1410 (1974); William L. Prosser, Privacy,48 Cal. L. Rev. 383 (1960); Samuel
D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193
(1890). Other papers in this symposium also focus on this issue. See Catherine
L. Fisk, Privacy, Power & Humiliation in the Workplace: The Problem of
Appearance Regulation, 66 La. L. Rev. 1111 (2006); Rafael Gely & Leonard
Bierman, Workplace Blogs & Workplace Privacy,66 La. L. Rev. 1079 (2006).
10. Once again, this is not a paper about the extent to which the parties
might be allowed to reach agreements to move the point of social protection to
the right to provide more privacy protection. See supra note 1. The parties can
do that and when they do, individuals may well be able to consent to waive
those contractual protections, too. Those kinds of agreements and those kinds of
waivers may present problems analogous to those discussed in this paper. But
they also have distinctive features. I will not discuss the analogies or the
distinctions here.
11. Under certain circumstances, society may prohibit even the individual
from disclosing information within this space. As I will discuss later, I think
this is generally to protect certain social interests that extend beyond the
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authority of the individual to determine whether disclosure is
permitted:
The root idea of privacy is that of a privileged territory or
domain in which an individual person has the exclusive
authority of determining whether another may enter, and if
so, when and for how long, and under what conditions.
Within this area, the individual person is-pick your
metaphor--boss, sovereign, owner.'
Thus, privacy and consent are intimately connected. Within
the domain protected by privacy, the thing that is protected is
precisely the individual's authority to consent or to withhold
consent. This concept of privacy protects human dignity in either
case.1 3 The ability to consent, the necessity of consent, empowers
individuals to express and invite intimacy in a way not possible if
the information were freely available. Protection when consent is
withheld affirms society's respect for an individual's control over
central aspects of his own existence. 14 Thus, privacy enhances an
individual's ability to express and invite intimacy, while
maintaining respect for his authority to maintain secrets. It is
consent that regulates these dual functions of privacy and that
allocates to the individual
authority over the precise function
15
privacy is to play.
This connection between privacy and consent has
consequences for the language we use. The concept of waiver, for
example, seems ill-suited to the task. It would be odd in many
circumstances (for example, invitations to intimacy) to think of the
situation as one where a privacy violation has occurred, but has
been waived. Quite the contrary. When individuals consent in
privacy situations, they are not waiving a right, but instead they are
exercising the central right protected by privacy, the authority to
individual and beyond the core idea of privacy, which is precisely to protect the
individual'sright to control this type of information. See infra pp. 998-1001.
12. Joel Feinberg, Offense to Others 24 (1985).
13. Stated another way, this conception of privacy is deonotological in
nature, rather than utilitarian. The claim is not that privacy protection will
produce the most utility across society or for individuals. Rather, the claim is
that privacy protection is an important part of our society's respect for persons
and their right to self-determination. John Kleinig, The Ethics of Consent, 8
Can. J. Phil. 91, 115-17 (Supp. 1982)
14. Jeffery H. Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood, 6 Phil. & Pub.
Aff. 26, 39 (1976). Reiman argues that this type of control is central to the very
concept of personhood. See also Heidi M. Hurd, The Moral Magic of Consent,
2 Legal Theory 121, 123-24 (1996).
15. Post, supra note 9, at 969-74.
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decide. Similarly, contract terms such as consideration and
modification seem out of place. It would be odd to think of
consent as some type of contract modification requiring
consideration when there was no contract in the first place, but
rather a type of social protection that can be affected by contract
16
but does not depend on contract for its existence or enforcement.
Once again, consent is the exercise of an authority protected by tort
law, not part of an independent agreement between the parties.17
Viewed in this way, the issue of consent in employment
settings becomes both more salient and more problematic. If our
willingness to credit employee consent becomes extremely
constrained because of doubts about voluntariness in the
employment setting, we are not aiding the cause of employee
privacy. Instead, we are stripping privacy of one of its central
component parts and infringing on one of its principal values: the
ability of individuals to decide these matters for themselves rather
than to have them controlled by others. Always refusing to
recognize employee consent transfers authority to the courts and
buys us little in the name of privacy. 18 At the same time, we
infringe on the central value of privacy if we credit employee
consent too readily. Recognizing employee consent in situations
where they do not have good information or adequate freedom to

16. Cf. Kleinig, supra note 13, at 114 (distinguishing between promise and
consent); Wisconsin Knife Works v. National Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280
(7th Cir. 1986) (discussing distinction between contract modification and

waiver).
17. Once again, in this article, I am discussing only the area to the left of the
point of social protection. See supra note 10. If employer and employee enter
into a valid contract to move the point of protection to the right, then the space
between the social point of protection and the new contractual point of
protection is, of course, the product of an independent agreement between the
parties. Talking in contract terms about how to enter into and modify
contractual points of protection to the right of the social point would be
appropriate.
18. Although the argument in this article is primarily deontological, see
supra note 13, limiting the authority of employees to consent also has very
practical implications. If employees cannot consent to privacy intrusions,
employers will be less likely to consult closely with employees in making
decisions that might affect their privacy. More crudely, if employees cannot
consent as a matter of law, employers will be unwilling to pay anything to
obtain that consent.
Cf. Christopher T. Wonnell, The Contractual
Disempowerment of Employees, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 87, 145 (1993) (employees
would be empowered if they could agree to specific performance as a remedy
when they breach employment contracts).
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make a meaningful choice also undercuts the principal value of
privacy protection. 19
II. THE CURRENT STATUS OF CONSENT AT WORK
A recent draft of the Restatement of Employment Law contains
the clearest statement of current law on employee consent in
privacy situations. In the most recent draft of the privacy section,
the Restatement greatly limits the ability of employees to consent
to privacy intrusions 21 Thus, the Restatement sides with those who
worry about the ability of employees to consent effectively. But,
of course, this is a trade-off. When the Restatement minimizes the
ability of employees to consent, it also limits their autonomy. In
this section, I will examine the draft Restatement language closely
and apply it to several situations. As with all Restatements, this
draft language not only "restates" the law; it attempts to
19. For a more complete discussion of the conditions required for a valid
consent, see infra pp. 1001-1008.
20. The American Law Institute began a project several years ago to restate
the law of the employment relationship. Christine Jolls, a professor and highlyregarded scholar at the Harvard Law School, is the reporter for the privacy
section of this effort. The first draft of the Restatement of Employment Law,
issued in May, 2002, contained only a short memorandum on privacy issues.
Restatement (Third) of Employment Law 1-11 (Prelim. Draft No. 1, 2002) (the
numbering system for this draft was not ideal; these pages appear at the very end
of Preliminary Draft No. 1). A more substantial consideration of privacy issues
was presented in the second preliminary draft issued in 2004. Restatement
(Third) of Employment Law §§ 5.01-5.04 (Prelim. Draft No. 2, 2004). A
revised and more complete version of the privacy section was included in the
third preliminary draft issued in May, 2005.
Restatement (Third) of
Employment Law §§ 5.01-5.06 (Prelim. Draft No. 3, 2005) (hereinafter
"Restatement (Third)"). Later in 2005, a draft of the Employment Law
Restatement was prepared for presentation to the Council of the American Law
Institute. That draft, however, did not contain a section on privacy issues.
Restatement (Third) of Employment Law (Council Draft No. 1, 2005).
Similarly, a discussion draft prepared for the 2006 annual meeting did not
contain a privacy section. Restatement (Third) of Employment Law (Discussion
Draft, 2006). Thus, the Restatement's latest consideration of privacy issues is
contained in Preliminary Draft No. 3. That is the draft this article will consider.
I am a member of the Members Consultative Group for the Restatement of
Employment Law and have commented on each of the drafts.
21. This draft of the Restatement of Employment Law is still under
consideration by the American Law Institute and, therefore, does not yet
represent the position of the Institute. For stylistic reasons, I will refer to the
draft Restatement language on privacy in various ways, but every reference
should be understood as referring only to a draft that has not yet been adopted or
approved. This is true even when I refer simply to the "Restatement" without
direct reference to its draft status.
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reformulate and improve it. This section will focus on the draft
Restatement language, but it is also intended to explore problems
with the current state of the law more broadly.
Under the draft Restatement language, a privacy violation
occurs if an employer's conduct intrudes upon an employee's
privacy interests and is highly offensive to a reasonable person in
On the first prong, the Restatement
the employment context.
makes employee consent irrelevant to the most common types of
employer conduct that might present a privacy issue. The
Restatement specifically lists seventypes of questionable employer
conduct: examining bodily products, monitoring excretory
functions, observing an employee in a state of undress, viewing the
contents of a locked receptacle, secretly observing an employee,
secretly listening to an employee, and secretly intercepting an
employee's telephone conversation. These are the only types of
conduct the Restatement currently lists specifically, although
others may be added later. 24 With respect to all 25of them, the
Restatement says that employee consent is irrelevant.
22. Restatement (Third), supra note 20, § 5.0(1)-(2). The Restatement
currently considers only the "intrusion upon seclusion" aspect of privacy. Email from Christine Jolls to Steven Willborn (April 21, 2006) (on file with
author). Thus, it does not cover the other aspects of Dean Prosser's classic fourpart formulation, including especially the disclosure prong. Prosser, supra note
9, at 389-407. I learned this late in the process of writing this article and it may
affect some of the situations I discuss. The extent of the impact will obviously
depend on the approach to consent adopted for the other aspects of privacy. If
consent is viewed as skeptically later as it is in the current draft, the effect will
be minimal.
23. Id. § 5.03(l)-(7). I have shortened the descriptions of the conduct a bit;
please refer to the Restatement for a more complete description. In addition,
here and elsewhere, I will generally refer only to employees, even though the
Restatement is rightfully careful to include applicants within the protected
group.
24. The Reporter for this portion of the Restatement has indicated that the
list is not yet complete and that, at a minimum, an additional category will be
added to cover computer monitoring. E-mail from Christine Jolls to Steven
Willborn (April 21, 2006) (on file with author).
25. Id. § 5.04(1) ("Notwithstanding an employee's or applicant's express or
implied agreement to submit to a particular form of employer conduct, the
employer conduct intrudes upon employee privacy interests if it falls within [one
of the seven specified categories]"). There are two odd twists to this. First,
three of the specified behaviors require the employer to engage in the conduct
"secretly." Id. § 5.04(5)-(7). The Restatement recognizes that employee
consent may indicate that the conduct was not secret. Id. § 5.04, comment b.
But even there, it nods to employee consent only grudgingly. Id. ("in some
circumstances employee or applicant agreement will mean that an employer
behavior no longer meets the secrecy requirement . . . ." (emphasis added)).
Presumably, the Reporter is thinking of circumstances in which the employee
agreement is too vague or old to obviate the secrecy of the employer's conduct.
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In addition to the specified categories of conduct that might
intrude upon an employee's privacy interest, the draft Restatement
language also has a catch-all: an employer also invades an
employee privacy interest if it intrudes upon an employee's
reasonable expectation of privacy in some other way.
With
respect to the catch-all, the Restatement says that employee
consent is relevant, but limited in value.
In these other
circumstances, employee consent "does not necessarily negate the
employee's ...

reasonable expectation of privacy," but instead is

merely evidence that "together with other factors [may] support the
conclusion that the employee.., lacks a reasonable expectation of
privacy ...

,,27

To be unlawful under the draft Restatement language, an
employer's conduct must also be highly offensive to a reasonable
person in the employment context.2° The Restatement makes it
clear that employee consent is also irrelevant to this prong of a
privacy claim. 2 9 This determination is to be made solely by
balancing two objective factors: the degree of invasiveness of the
employer conduct and the weight30 of the employer's business
reasons for engaging in the conduct.
Thus, the Restatement's current position is that employee
consent plays only a very limited role in privacy cases. In cases
where the employer's conduct falls within one of the seven
specified areas, employee consent is wholly irrelevant. It is
irrelevant to determine whether there has been an intrusion upon a
privacy interest precisely because the conduct falls within one of
Second, another of the specified behaviors is viewing the contents of a locked
receptacle. The draft Restatement language says that employers may be able to
avoid problems with this privacy category simply by keeping a key to the
receptacle and so informing the employee or applicant. Id. § 5.04, comment c.
This is not central to my argument here, but it is interesting. Thinking of this
situation as consent at all reflects a fairly narrow view of what might be required
to obtain employee consent. All the employer has done, after all, is to keep the
key and inform employees. This implies the possibility of consent through mere
notice, a position that is advanced elsewhere in the Restatement of Employment
Law. Restatement (Third) of Employment Law § 3.05 (Discussion Draft, 2006)
(in most circumstances, unilateral commitments of employers can be modified
or revoked by notifying employees). As I discuss later, I do not think that is a
sufficiently robust view of consent for these purposes. See infra pp. 1001-1008.
26. Restatement (Third), supranote 20, § 5.03(8).
27. Id. § 5.04(2)(a) & (b).
28. Id. § 5.02(2).
29.

Id. § 5.05.

30. Id. § 5.02, comment b.
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the seven specified areas. It is irrelevant to determine whether the
intrusion was highly offensive to a reasonable person because
employee consent is always irrelevant on that issue. Employee
consent is only relevant under the Restatement's current approach
in situations where the employer's conduct might intrude upon an
employee's privacy interest because it interferes with a reasonable
expectation of privacy. But even there, the role of employee
consent is limited.
Employee consent is relevant in that
circumstance, but the draft Restatement language makes clear that
employers can intrude on reasonable expectations of privacy even
in the face of employee consent.
Consider how the Restatement's construct would apply to this
situation:
Steve Willborn is a performance artist.
His art is
innovative and highly entertaining, 31 but it involves his
total nudit and that of several other performers whom he
employs. He notifies his fellow performers of the nature
of his art and requires them to sign a document consenting
to the required nudity. After some performances, one of
the performers 33
sues him for an invasion of privacy. Is
Willbom liable?
Willborn would be liable under the Restatement's proposal.
The employee would have to prove both that the conduct invades a
privacy interest and that it is highly offensive to a reasonable
employee. 34 On the privacy interest prong, the conduct falls within
one of the specified types of questionable conduct (observing an
employee in a state of undress)."35 Thus, the employee's consent is
irrelevant.
Willborn has intruded upon his employee's privacy
interest.
On the offensiveness prong, the employee would have to prove
that the degree of invasiveness outweighs the employer's business
reasons for the behavior. 37 I made this a performance artist
31. Just like his lectures.
32. This is in contrast to his lectures, so you did not miss anything if you
were not at the symposium itself (or, alternatively, you should not feel such
relief at having missed the symposium).
33. Although this hypothetical may seem farfetched at first glance, it is not
hard to find similar situations in real life. See Feminist Women's Health Center
v. Superior Court, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 187 (3rd Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (rejecting
privacy claim of employee who was required to demonstrate cervical selfexaminations in front of other employees as part of her job responsibilities).
34. Restatement (Third), supranote 20, § 5.02(1)-(2).
35. Id. § 5.03(3).
36. Id. § 5.04(1).
37. Id. § 5.02, comments b, c, & d.
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hypothetical to make it easy to meet this prong. One of the
principal objects of my performance art (it is my performance art,
after all), like much performance art, is precisely to arouse people
by being highly offensive. The offensiveness prong is an objective
test, so my particular intent does not matter and certainly my
business reasons are strong. But the Restatement takes special care
to indicate that a high degree of invasiveness (and my art will
involve a very high degree) will outweigh even important business
met. 39
reasons. Thus, the "highly offensive" prong would also be
The Restatement is clear that the employee's consent has no role in
this part of the analysis either. 4° Other situations involving
employee nudity, such as sumo wrestling and dancers at strip
clubs, would be closer calls, but they would also certainly violate
the privacy interests of employees and may violate the objective
might
balancing test,
4 1 without regard to any consent the employees
have given.
This example illustrates two types of problems with the
First, the Restatement's distrust of
Restatement's proposal.
consent undermines one of the central values of privacy. A
principal value of privacy is to allocate to individuals control over
central aspects of their lives. The draft Restatement language
protects employees from having that control usurped by
38. Id. § 5.02, comment d.
39. A common response to this hypothetical is to claim that such
performance art could never meet the offensiveness prong; the invasiveness of
the employee nudity would always be outweighed by the employer's strong
business interest in artistic performance. I think this objection misses the mark
for two reasons. First, this framework exposes employers like Willborn in the
hypothetical to the risk that judges and juries will view the balance differently.
The risk itself is a problem and, in this particular case, is likely to impose a
burden on free expression. Moreover, the risk will be greater as the artistic
expression becomes less socially acceptable, which heightens the burden on free
expression. Second, the objection misses the main point of the hypothetical: the
problem with severe limits on employee consent. Employees are not permitted
to consent to this type of nudity and, thus, employers can take no refuge in
consent. If this hypothetical does not seem convincing, then imagine your own
in which the conduct is highly offensive, but for whatever reasons the employee
really wants to consent to it. This framework does not respect employee
autonomy sufficiently to honor the consent and, as a result, it inhibits the ability
of employers to engage in the activity.
40. Id. § 5.05.
41. It is worth noting that the draft Restatement language does not provide
employers in Willbom's position with any option to ensure that they would not
be sued later. Although the Restatement does not speak to the issue directly, it
would be quite odd to permit an employee to waive these privacy rights. The
same factors that cause the Restatement to take the position that we should
ignore employee consent would also apply with the same force to an employee
waiver.
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overreaching employers. But instead of restoring that authority to
employees, the Restatement transfers it to the courts. Even the
most competent and knowledgeable employee with the freedom to
exercise meaningful choice cannot consent to these types of
privacy intrusions. The proposal deprives employees of an
important part of the dignity and respect normally conferred by
privacy law. Second, the Restatement framework permits privacy
law to be used to limit free expression. It may well be that society
disapproves of performance art, sumo wrestling, strip clubs, and
the like, but if that is the case, then direct regulation would be far
preferable to regulation through privacy law.
Both direct
regulation and privacy law would infringe on the ability of
individuals to engage in these activities, but direct regulation
would at least avoid the paradox of prohibiting employees from
agreeing to engage in these activities within a doctrinal framework
intended42 to protect the ability of individuals to make these
choices.
This hypothetical also raises problems relating to the timing of
consent. The draft Restatement language makes no distinction
between a waiver signed at the time of hiring and a waiver signed
after ten years of employment. Both should be ignored or,
alternatively stated, employees are denied autonomy in both
situations. A more nuanced view of autonomy is certainly
possible. In this circumstance, the demand by Willborn is the
same in both cases: take your clothes off.43 The threat, however, is
different. In the first situation, the threat is to refuse to hire the
employee. In the second situation, the threat is to fire a current
employee. Generally speaking, the first threat is not as severe as
the second threat. In a world with many entry-level jobs, being
excluded from one may not be too high a price to pay to protect
employee autonomy. The employee, however, has much more
invested in the second situation. Permitting the employer to fire
her is a high price, maybe too high a price, to ask the employee to
pay for autonomy.4 Note the distinction between this position and
42. As I discuss later, my view is that other interests, such as worries about
performance art or strip clubs, can override privacy, but that it is paradoxical to
claim that privacy interests themselves limit employee consent. Instead, the
appropriate way to approach these issues is to recognize that limiting employee
consent is a limit on privacy, but that under certain conditions privacy interests
can be overridden by strong non-privacy interests. See infra pp. 998-1001.
43. For a more detailed description of this type of analysis, see discussion
infra notes pp. 1001-1008.
44. This depends, of course, on a comparison of how long it takes new
employees and current employees to find other jobs and the pay and working
conditions of those jobs relative to the "first" job. My intuition is that current
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the Restatement position. The draft Restatement language does not
differentiate at all between different levels of employer pressure
and, as a result, does not nod at all to employee autonomy. The
position I will suggest below is not the opposite of that: total
deference to employee autonomy. Rather, it calls for a more
nuanced view of employee choice and autonomy, thereby
permitting the possibility of more employee control over these
The position argues for deference to
important decisions.
employee autonomy when the cost of that deference is reasonable
(or, alternatively stated, when employees can exercise a
meaningful choice), but no deference otherwise.45
Consider another situation, this one from real life:
Trevis Smith, a former University of Alabama linebacker,
plays for the Saskatchewan Roughriders in the Canadian
Football League. With his consent, the team administers an
HIV test and discovers that he has the virus. But he does
not consent to release of the information. Can the team
release the information without his permission or not let
him play? 46
As we did last time, let us begin by considering how this
situation would be analyzed under the draft Restatement language.
First, how does the Restatement suggest we analyze the initial
consent given by Smith to conduct the HIV test? The first issue is
whether the test constitutes an invasion of an employee privacy
interest. The Restatement is clear that the employer's conduct is
an invasion of Smith's privacy interests. The employer conduct
falls within one of the specified 4 uestionable behaviors: examining
an employee's bodily products. Thus, the employee's consent is
irrelevant. 48 This seems odd: an employer invades an employee's
privacy interests when it conducts a blood test with the employee's
employees are more disadvantaged in these regards than new employees, but it
is an empirical question. See Robert Topel, Specific Capital, Mobility, and
Wages: Wages Rise with Job Seniority, 99 J. Pol. Econ. 145, 147 (1991) (finding
that ten years of experience increases the wages of a male worker by 25
percent). But see Joseph G. Altonji & Nicolas Williams, Do Wages Rise with
Job Seniority?A Reassessment, Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 6010, 29-31 (1997), available at http://papers.nbor.org/papers/w6010
(concluding that returns to seniority are modest).
45. See infra 1001-1008.
46. Rick Westhead, H.IV. Debate Emerges in Canada, N.Y. Times, Nov.
15, 2005, at C27. I will not consider any complications arising in this case
because Canadian law would apply.
47. Restatement (Third), supranote 20, § 5.03(1).

48. Id.§ 5.04(1).
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consent. But it is a direct consequence of the distrust of employee
consent in the Restatement and its concomitant limit on employee
autonomy.
Be that as it may, Smith's consent is relevant under the draft
Restatement language, if at all, only on the issue of whether the
test would be highly offensive to a reasonable employee. One
would think the consent would be quite relevant to that issue,
indeed, virtually dispositive. My own intuition is that most
reasonable employees would find it to be highly offensive if an
HIV test were done without their consent, but would find it
completely inoffensive if the test were done with their consent.
But the Restatement comes out quite differently on this. The
employee's consent to the test is irrelevant under the
Restatement.4 9 The offensiveness of the test depends solely on the
balance between the degree of the invasiveness of the test against
50
the employer's business reasons for administering the test.
Again, it seems very odd to think about the degree of invasiveness
in this context without thinking about whether the employee
consented, but that is what the Restatement asks us to do. Under
the Restatement, there is a privacy invasion by irrebutable
presumption, so the outcome would seem to depend mostly on the
employer's interest in administering the test. If that interest is not
strong enough or absent, even a fairly modest
invasion may be too
52
much. More about this type of issue later.
But what about the second half of the problem: will the
employer violate Smith's privacy if it discloses the results of the
HIV test? This is a situation that falls within the Restatement's
catch-all category, rather than one of the seven specified behaviors.
The employer will infringe on the employer's privacy interest if its
actions intrude upon the employee's reasonable expectation of
privacy.5 3 A Restatement comment says that will turn on
"background societal norms" which are "familiar from cases
arising under the federal Constitution."5 4 Whether that is true or
not (and I have serious doubts), our focus here is on the role of
employee consent in making that determination. On that, the
Restatement says only that the employee's privacy interests may
49. Id. § 5.05.
50. Id. § 5.02, comment b.
51. I find it hard to believe that employee consent would not be entered into
this analysis through the backdoor by saying it is relevant to the degree of
invasiveness of the employer's conduct, but what the Restatement tells us
explicitly is that it is not going to do that. Id. § 5.05.
52. See infra pp. 989-91.
53. Restatement (Third), supra note 20, § 5.03(8).
54. Id. § 5.03, comment i.
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be infringed, even if the employee has given consent." In this
case, however, the employee has not given consent.
The
Restatement does not address this specifically, but the thrust of the
Restatement indicates that the absence of consent would be very
important, maybe determinative, in deciding whether the employer
violated the employee's reasonable expectation of privacy.
Assuming such a violation, has there been an unlawful invasion of
employee privacy? That depends, once again, on whether the
unconsented release is highly offensive to the reasonable employee
which, in turn, depends on how the degree of invasiveness
compares to the employer's reasons for the invasion." In this
case, the invasiveness is high (unconsented release of medical
information), 7 but the employer's business reasons for release are
also high. Football, after all, is a violent sport where exchange of
bodily fluids takes place regularly; the employer has an interest in
protecting other players, among other things. 58 A Restatement
comment says that a serious intrusion on a privacy interest may
trump an important business interest, 59 but it is impossible to say
how that concept would be applied in practice.
Finally, consider a variation. In Smith's case, there were thirdparty interests at stake that provided justification for the
employer's interest in his HIV status. 6° What if these third-party
interests did not exist? Consider this situation:
Eddie Curry was the fourth pick in the 2001 National
Basketball Association draft. He did not play in the last
thirteen games of the 2004-2005 when he was diagnosed
with an irregular heartbeat. After the season was over, his
employer, the Chicago Bulls, asked him to take a DNA test
to make sure he did not have a related medical problem:
55. Id. § 5.04(2) (consent does not "necessarily negate" employee's
reasonable expectation of privacy, but instead is one relevant factor).

56. Id. §5.02, comments b,c, & d.
57. Obviously other law, such as HIPAA, may apply to situations like this.
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C. and 29 U.S.C.). Our focus, however, is on the privacy claim. For
discussion of how to consider statutes affecting privacy interests, see infra pp.
998-1001.
58. Tony Miles, a player who played against Mr. Smith in the Canadian
Football League, said that he was "shocked" he was not informed of Mr.
Smith's status: "I don't want to be the one who goes out and plays a sport that I
love and comes home H.I.V. positive. I'm just overwhelmed that he was out
there playing while H.I.V. positive.... ." Westhead, supra note 46, at C27, col.
4.
59. Restatement (Third), supra note 20, § 5.02, comment d.
60. See supranote 58.
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hypertrophic cardiomyopathy. That condition had caused
the sudden deaths of other basketball stars, such as Reggie
Lewis and Hank Gathers. Curry refused to take the test.
Can the Bulls conduct the test anyway, or fire him?6
As a preliminary matter, under the proposed Restatement
analysis, Curry's privacy will be violated if the test is
administered, whether or not he consents. This employer conduct
falls within one of the specified behaviors (examining bodily
products). 62 Therefore, it is a privacy intrusion and employee
consent is irrelevant. 63 But will the employer act unlawfully if it
conducts the test even without consent, or fires him? One issue
this raises is whether the two options ought to be treated the same.
It seems likely the employer would act unlawfully if it conducted
the test without Curry's permission. Using the Restatement's
balancing test, that would seem to be highly offensive to the
reasonable employee; the invasion of Curry's privacy interest
would be severe and there is only a limited employer interest. On
this last point, note that unlike Smith's case, here the employer's
interest is much lower. The danger is only to Curry himself, not to
others. 64 Should, then, the employer also be prohibited from
discharging Curry because he refuses to take the test? This raises a
question about symmetry between the two situations.65
But consider another possibility. What if Curry consented to
the DNA test and then sued for a privacy violation later? Again,
even with consent, the employer has invaded Curry's privacy
61. Bulls, Curry, Lawyers Tussle Over DNA Testing, USA Today, Sept. 29,
2005, at 12C. The firing issue is, obviously, complicated. For our purposes, it
would help to assume a) that there is no union involved and b) that the
individual contract is silent on the issue. Neither of these, of course, was true in
the Curry case.
Two other items of interest on the case itself. First, the situation was
resolved when the Bulls traded Curry to the New York Knicks who, presumably,
did not ask for a DNA test. Second, the Bulls' precise offer to Curry was, shall
we say, fairly generous. The precise offer was, please take the test. If you pass
it, fine, we will continue to pay you $5 million per year. If you fail it, we will
pay you $400,000 per year for 50 years. NBA Approves Curry's Trade to
Knicks, http://www.msnbc.comlid/7279844/did/9584562 (Nov. 4, 2005) (last
visited March 1, 2006). Query: If Curry had agreed to the DNA test, should this
offer cause us to give more or less weight to his consent? See infra 1001-1008.
62. Restatement (Third), supra note 20, § 5.03(1).
63. Id. § 5.04(1).
64. In this respect, the case is like UAW v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187
(1999), in which the Supreme Court said the employer's business concerns did
not extend to protection of the fetuses of workers. That issue, the Court said,
should be left to the female workers, themselves. If anything, this case is easier:
the danger is only to Curry, himself.
65.

See supranote 111.
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interest. The intrusion falls within one of the specified behaviors,
so the consent is irrelevant. Would the DNA test be highly
offensive to the reasonable employee? Once again, this turns on a
balance between the seriousness of the invasion and the weight of
the employer's business-related reasons. This raises two sets of
issues. First, does Curry's consent lessen the seriousness of the
invasion? My intuition is strongly that consent would lessen the
seriousness of the 66invasion, but the Restatement asserts that
consent is irrelevant.
Second, does it matter to the privacy claim that the employer's
business-related reasons for the intrusion are very minor? Once
again, the only danger here is the danger to Curry himself. What
should the result be where the privacy invasion is relatively minor
(because consent was given, but nevertheless a privacy violation
because for that purpose the consent must be ignored), but there is
no legitimate business-related reason for the invasion? The
Restatement says that a serious invasion can override an important
business-related reason. 67 It does not say whether a not-so-serious
invasion can result in high offensiveness where there is little or no
business justification. Does the balancing test require the intrusion
to override the business justification just a little bit, or a lot? Does
the extent of the imbalance required vary depending on the severity
of the privacy intrusion? These types of questions and this type of
indeterminancy, of course, are general problems with balancing
tests.
In sum, the most current approach to the issue of employee
consent, the draft language of the Restatement of Employment
Law, illustrates problems at two levels. First, at a broad level, the
approach greatly minimizes employee autonomy and, in so doing,
undermines one of the principal functions of privacy protection.
Second, at a more fine-tuned level, the approach fails to provide
clear and straightforward answers to even relatively simple
questions, and certainly not to more difficult ones. There should
be a straight, quick, and intuitive answer to the question of whether
an employee's privacy has been violated when an employer
conducts a medical test with the employee's permission. The
current approach does not do that, primarily because it doubts too
much the ability of employees to consent.

66. Restatement (Third), supranote 20, § 5.05.
67. Id. § 5.02, comment d.
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III. THINKING ABOUT CONSENTING EMPLOYEES

It is much easier to describe problems and criticize the
approach of others than it is to suggest solutions. The rest of the
paper will suggest solutions, or at least guidelines for thinking
about solutions.
In an ideal world, an approach to the issue of employee consent
to privacy intrusions would accomplish several goals. First, it
would recognize and affrmn the role of consent within a privacy
regime. It would recognize the value in permitting individuals to
choose for themselves the boundaries of their own privacy, which
will vary between individuals and across circumstances. Second,
where employee consent is to be relied upon, it would ensure that
the consent was meaningful. This would mean that the employee
was competent, had good information, and adequate freedom to
make a meaningful choice. 68 Third, results would be predictable
for both employees and employers. Among other things, this
would mean that balancing tests would be minimized.
Of course, we do not live in an ideal world. Trade-offs have to
be made when goals conflict. The gritty reality of the workplace
will interfere with the ability to have pristine employee consent.
The world is complex, so it will be impossible to specify every
outcome. Nevertheless, these general goals can help us think
better about an acceptable approach to employee consent within a
privacy regime.
A. Privacyis Only One Good Regulatedby Consent
Problems with consent are not unique to privacy. Consent is
everywhere in employment law. 69 Employees consent to receive
certain wages, to changes in their health care packages, to their
hours and working conditions, to everything.
To be sure, there
68.

See infra 1001-1008.

69. Even more broadly, of course, problems with consent are present
everywhere in the law generally. But I am going to stick here to something
about which I know at least a little bit.
70. Obviously, I am mushing together many different types of consent here.
Wages probably require an actual agreement, promise or contract; changes to
health care plans are often accomplished by consent or endorsement; employees
probably assent or merely submit to working conditions; the latest draft of the
Restatement claims that employers can change most goods by mere notice to
employees. Restatement (Third) of Employment Law § 3.05 (Discussion Draft,
2006). It is certainly true that consent is a rich concept with an extensive
"semantic field." Kleinig, supra note 13, at 93 (consent encompasses many
terms including agreement, acquiescence, compliance, concurrence, willingness,
connivance, condonation, accession, assent, submission, approval, permission,
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are concerns in all these areas with the ability of employees to
consent effectively, which often leads to regulation of either
consent or of the substantive arrangements themselves. Indeed,
employment law can be viewed generally as society's reaction
when it is dissatisfied with the outcomes produced by consensual
arrangements. 7 1 But this merely re-emphasizes the central role of
consent in the employment relationship, with law operating only at
the margins when72 society thinks that consent has failed for one
reason or another.
For our purposes, this means that, once a privacy right is
recognized, the focus should be on the validity of employee
consent, not on the nature of the particular privacy right at issue. It
is certainly possible to parse different types of privacy invasions
and then make claims about the role of consent given the particular
type of privacy at stake. That is, in fact, what the Restatement
does when it says that employee consent has a role for particular
types of privacy threats, but not for others. But I have come to
believe that is wrong, primarily because of the ubiquity of consent
in employment law. If the general approach to consent is going to
be to parse each of the particular goods at stake into pieces with
consent playing a different role for each piece, then the result will
be chaos. There
73 are simply too many goods and too many possible
ways to parse.
Let me be clear, however. This is a fairly limited claim about
focus. It is not a claim that important differences in privacy threats
should be ignored. First, I am talking here only about situations

promise, authorization, consensus, concord and endorsement). But once again
this merely serves to re-emphasize the main point here: consent, broadly
construed, is ubiquitous in employment law.
71. Willborn, supranote 4, at 3.
72. Professor Selmi makes a closely related point in his contribution to this
symposium. His point, reinterpreted, is that privacy is only one good in the
workplace and not even close to the most important good. Michael Selmi,
Privacyfor the Working Class, 66 La. L. Rev. 1035, 1045-46 (2006) ("[I]t is not
at all clear that privacy is the crucial "dignity" value--if we were concerned
about employee dignity, we ought to begin by requiring employers to pay a
living wage. Compared to wages and even working conditions, consider the
recent mining disasters in West Virginia, privacy is at most a secondary or even
a tertiary workplace value.").
73. In the draft of the paper I presented at the conference, I attempted this
type of parsing with privacy. I attempted to identify different kinds of privacy
that might then require different levels of consent. But I now think that that type
of approach places the emphasis on the wrong side of the equation. The
emphasis should be on consent, not on the particular good (privacy) being
regulated by consent.
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where there is social protection for the privacy interest at stakesituations to the left of the point of social protection in Figure 1.74
Determining the point of social protection will, of course, require
close examination of the precise nature of the privacy interest at
stake. Consent is irrelevant to that inquiry because the inquiry's
purpose is to decide if consent is necessary. 75 But once that
inquiry has concluded that privacy protection applies, the thing
protected is the employee's ability to maintain or waive privacy.
Thus, the focus at that point should be on consent, not on the level
of the privacy threat.
Second, to say that the focus should be on consent is not to say
that no attention should be paid to the good at stake, in this case
privacy. As I will discuss later, the nature of the privacy claim has
a role to play in our evaluation of the validity of employee consent.
We may well be more skeptical of free consent in situations where
the privacy threat is high than we are in situations where the
privacy threat is very minor.77 But again, the claim here is that the
focus should be on the consent at that point, not on the level of the
threat to privacy. The level of the threat to privacy is relevant, but
only because it may tell us something about the validity of consent.
B. Privacy as a Special Good
Although many goods are regulated by consent, privacy is a
special good. When privacy protections apply, the thing that is
protected is the ability of employees to give or withhold consent.
74. See suprap. 978.
75. The distinction here-that consent is relevant only after a determination
that social protection applies-cannot be made cleanly. Although the first
determination should be made mostly based on other factors, see suprapp. 97778, the culture of the workplace and the social setting will also be relevant. As
Justice Scalia put it famously in another context, "A professional football
player's working environment is not.., abusive.., if the coach smacks him on
the buttocks as he heads onto the football field-even if the same behavior
would reasonably be experienced as abusive by the coach's secretary... back
at the office." Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81,
118 S. Ct. 998, 1003 (1998). Factors such as culture and social setting can be
squeezed into the semantics of consent; people choose to join and participate in
creating work cultures. But to the extent possible, I think it would be preferable
to view the first step of the analysis as determining whether consent is required
and the second step as determining whether consent has been given. But a
caveat: This is a paper about the second step of the analysis where I claim
strongly that consent is the only issue. I have paid less attention to the proper
analysis for determining whether a privacy interest exists which shifts authority
to the individual holding the interest.
76. See supra978-80.
77. See infra 1002-04.
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With other goods, there is a social interest in protecting the ability
of employees to choose, but there is always something else that is
protected, too. Thus, the focus on consent is all the more crucial
when privacy is the good at stake because, in a very direct sense,
consent is the good, and the only good, being protected.
To illustrate, compare minimum wage regulation and privacy
protection. When a state imposes a minimum wage, it is infringing
on an employee's ability to consent to lower wages, but it is doing
so to protect another employee interest: a fair wage. 78 One way of
thinking about the demise of Lochner,79 which relied heavily on
protecting the ability of employees to choose long hours, is that the
courts began to defer much more to the legislature's judgment that
this other interest was sufficiently strong to override the interest in
protecting employee consent.80 When privacy is protected, in
contrast, the only good that is being protected is the employee's
authority to consent. There is no 8 other accompanying good
analogous to the interest in fair wages. '
This means that the focus on consent is even more crucial in
privacy cases than it is in the many other situations where consent
is relevant. In every other case, there is another good which can be
balanced against the loss of autonomy. With privacy, the good
78. Given the current level of the federal minimum wage, this is an overly
generous statement of the employee interest protected. It would be closer to the
mark to say that the federal minimum wage protects something like the
employee's interest in avoiding unconscionably low wages, or something like
that. But a "fair wage" is shorter and, since the precise description is not
relevant to my argument here, I will use it for that reason.
79. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 25 S. Ct. 539 (1905).
80. Or, conversely, the courts came to believe that the right to contract
(consent) was almost never sufficient to override the legislature's determination
that another interest was more important. Cf. David A. Strauss, Why Was
Lochner Wrong, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 373 (2003) (Lochnerwas wrong not because
it recognized the important value of freedom of contract, but because it failed to
recognize the complexities of balancing that right against other important
interests).
81. One of my readers suggested at this point that privacy does include nonconsent interests analogous to the interest in fair wages. Just as minimum wage
laws are intended to protect the interest in fair wages, privacy is intended to
protect employee interests in secrecy, anonymity, and solitude. See supranote 6
and accompanying text. The difference, I think, is that there is a societal interest
in fair wages independent of employee consent, but not in secrecy, anonymity,
and solitude. Within the privacy regime, there is no societal interest in any
particular level of secrecy, anonymity, or solitude, so long as the employee
consents to that level. The point of privacy law is to protect the employee's
authority to control these aspects of her life. But there is a societal interest in
maintaining fair wages, even if the employee would consent to lower wages.
The point of the minimum wage laws is not primarily to protect employee
choice, but rather to ensure a particular wage level.
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being protected, the only good at stake, is autonomy. Limiting the
role of consent in privacy cases yields an incoherent result;
limiting consent undermines the only interest privacy is intended to
protect. As a result, focusing on consent in privacy cases
82 is even
more important than it is in the rest of employment law.
C. The Role of Courts
The function of consent in employment law generally, and the
special nature of privacy as a good, have direct implications for the
role of the courts in privacy cases: once a privacy right has been
recognized, a court's role should be to ensure respect for the
employee's consent or withholding of consent. Thus, a court
might appropriately inquire into whether the employee had
sufficient capacity to consent (for example, was of legal age and
sound mind) or whether the employee had sufficient freedom to
make a meaningful choice. But when a valid consent is present, a
court should not as part of the privacy analysis examine the
outrageousness of the privacy
invasion or inquire into the
83
reasonableness of the consent.
Moral philosophers would refer to this position as one of weak
paternalism. It is appropriate for a court to disregard a person's
consent if they are not in a position to give genuine consent and
would not consent if they were in a position to give genuine
consent.
On the other hand, my position rejects strong
paternalism. If the person does give genuine consent or would
consent if in a position to do so genuinely,
courts should respect
84
that outcome without further inquiry.
82. The special role of 'consent in privacy law is a strong reason for
rejecting the draft Restatement's suggested "notice" rule for changing employer
obligations which applies to most employment goods. Restatement (Third), of
Employment Law § 3.05 (Discussion Draft, 2006). First, as stated in the text,
for other goods, there is something other than consent at stake. For privacy, the
good at stake is consent. Thus, something more than employer notice should be
required to evidence consent. Second, the employee's right to exercise consent
arises only after a privacy interest has been recognized. Thus, privacy is unique
in that this prior step allocates authority to decide away from the employer and
to employees. Permitting employers to reclaim that authority by simple notice is
inconsistent with the prior finding of a privacy right. But see Marigny v. Ellis,
1991 WL 126370 (E.D. La. 1991) (finding employee consented to drug testing
when he continued to work for employer after notice of policy).
83. My position is not that these additional inquiries are improper in
general. My position is rather that they should not be made as part of the
privacy analysis.
84. On weak and strong paternalism generally, see Robert Young,
Autonomy and Paternalism,8 Can. J. Phil. 47 (Supp. 1982).
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To illustrate, consider a situation where the employer flagrantly
invades an important privacy interest of an employee, with little or
no business purpose, but for whatever reasons the employee has
given valid consent to the invasion.
My position, weak
paternalism, is clear that in this circumstance, courts should not
find a privacy violation. The employee has consented and that
ends the inquiry. Courts should not inquire further into how severe
the privacy intrusion was or how little justification there was for it.
Note two things about this. First, this differs from the
Restatement's approach. For severe privacy intrusions, those that
fall into the seven specified categories the Restatement says that
employee consent should be ignored.W5 Thus, in those areas at
least (and maybe more), the courts' focus will be on other factors,
such as the seriousness of the intrusion or the employer's business
interest, rather than on the employee's consent. As I have said
repeatedly, I think this undermines the very interest privacy is
intended 8to6 uphold--the authority of the individual over these
decisions.
Second, in the real world, things are not going to be as clean as
in my hypothetical where the employee's consent is handled by
assumption. In the real world, the validity of the employee's
consent is likely to be at issue and, as I discuss later,87 factors such
as the degree of the intrusion and the employee's business interest
will be relevant to making that determination. 88 The key, however,
is to identify the issue appropriately. The issue is whether the
employee has consented effectively. If she has, the courts' inquiry
85. Restatement (Third), supra note 20, § 5.04(1).
86. Although the argument is not made explicitly, the Restatement could be
based on the claim that consent within the employment relationship is so
compromised that a prohibition against recognizing such consent is the only
administratively feasible way of preventing improper employer pressure.
Viewed in this way, disregarding employee consent would be a "second-best
device for preventing certain forms of deception and duress that cannot be
attacked more directly." Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of
Contracts,92 Yale L.J. 763, 777-78 (1983) (making, but eventually rejecting,
this argument with respect to prohibitions against self-enslavement). See also
Wonnell, supra note 18, at 134-35. I think it would be quite difficult for this
argument to be made convincingly, which may be why it is not forwarded in the
Restatement. Sustaining the argument would require, first, an explanation of
why the threats of employer pressure are so much greater in privacy law than
they are everywhere else in employment law where employee consent is
examined critically, but accepted, and, second, an explanation of how such a
disregard of consent can be aligned with the primary interest privacy law is
intended to protect, employee autonomy.
87. See discussion infra Part III.E.

88. Id.
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is over. The other information is relevant only insofar as it assists
in making the consent determination.
D. DisregardingConsent
If this is the courts' role, are there any circumstances in which
an employee's consent should be disregarded? That is, assuming
valid consent, are there any circumstances where a court should
ignore or override that consent?
Within the privacy regime, courts should never ignore or
override valid employee consent. To permit courts to "protect"
privacy by ignoring employee consent is incoherent within the
privacy regime. The function of privacy is to protect employee
autonomy: and authority over these important aspects of her life.
Thus, at best, it is inconsistent with the goal of privacy protection
to permit courts to ignore consent. More precisely, I think, it is
incoherent theoretically to ignore employee consent in a regime
designed specifically to protect that consent.
Note two important aspects of this claim. First, I am assuming
here that there has been a valid consent, that is, a consent by a
competent employee, with adequate knowledge, and with adequate
freedom to make a decision. This means that courts will continue
to play a very important and difficult role in privacy cases. In the
next section, I will discuss how they should approach the issue of
consent in these cases. But the point here is that evaluating
consent is the extent of their appropriate role within the privacy
regime. When they determine that a valid consent has been given,
they must respect it. If they ignore consent and attempt to
"protect" privacy anyway, they infringe rather than advance the
core value protected by privacy.
But it is also very important to note the caveat that courts must
not ignore consent within the privacy regime. I will admit, indeed
claim, that circumstances exist where consent should be ignored or
overridden. Examples include situations where third parties will
be harmed, where there are laws prohibiting the activity, and where
there are claims that consent involves selling things which should
not be commodified. 90 My claim is that it may be appropriate to
89. As I discuss later, by valid consent I mean consent by a competent
employee, with adequate knowledge of the circumstances, and with adequate
freedom to make a choice.
90. See Leo Katz, Choice, Consent, and Cycling: The Hidden Limitationsof
Consent, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 627, 628 (2006). The focus of Professor Katz's
article is on another situation in which it may be appropriate to disregard
consent-cycling. I have not fully sorted through his argument to examine how
it might apply to the claim I make in this section, but my first impression is that

20061

CONSENTING EMPLOYEES

999

disregard consent in these situations, but only because of
considerations that lie outside of the privacy regime. Within the
privacy regime, the only appropriate outcome, given the
autonomy-enhancing purpose of the regime, is to credit consent
whenever it is valid. To do otherwise renders the privacy regime
incoherent. But there are circumstances where interests outside of
the privacy regime come into play and override the autonomyenhancing privacy interest at stake. If third-party interests are at
stake, those third-party interests lie outside the privacy regime
which is intended to protect the autonomy interests of the
individual holding the privacy right. The third-party interests may
be strong enough to override the privacy interest at stake. 91 Make
no mistake, when a third-party interest overrides a privacy interest
and consent is ignored, there is an infringement
on the privacy
92
interest. But it is a justified infringement.
To illustrate, consider again the Trevis Smith hypothetical
discussed earlier.93 Assume that Mr. Smith has a protected privacy
interest and that he does not consent to release of the information
about his HIV status. Thus, the privacy interest at stake requires
respect for his lack of consent. At the same time, however, there
are important
interests at stake-primarily the health of
h er94
r third-party
1
other players on the field. My claim is that the appropriate way
to analyze this claim is to determine whether the third-party
interests are sufficiently important to override the privacy interest
at stake. These third-party interests are not the privacy interest or
even part of the privacy claim. Quite the contrary, they are
inconsistent with the privacy claim. But if they are sufficiently
strong, they can override the privacy claim.

cycling is an interesting variation of third-party effects. Cycling only occurs
when there are two or more parties consenting. Thus, for my purposes, it would
fall within the claims I make for disregarding consent when third-party interests
are at stake.
91. In this sense, the claim is analogous to the claim I made about the
minimum wage earlier. See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
92. I do not mean to imply here that these other concerns must involve third
party interests. With respect to anti-commodification, for example, infringement
on privacy may be justified by essentially paternalistic concerns relating to the
pursuit of human freedom or human flourishing. Margaret Jane Radin, MarketInalienability, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1849 (1987). My points are simply: a) that
these concerns are not appropriate within a privacy regime designed to enhance
individual autonomy, but b) they can be relied upon to override the privacy
interest if considered appropriately as an important interest outside of the
privacy regime.
93. See supra text accompanying notes 46-59.
94. See supra note 58.
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Consider another example. In 1988, Congress enacted the
Employee Polygraph Protection Act. 95 One of the Act's goals was
to protect the privacy interests of employees, specifically, to protect
them from questioning that could be especially intrusive. The Act
also greatly limited the ability of employees to consent to polygraph
examinations. 9 7 How should courts analyze situations in which
employees freely consent to polygraph examinations? 98 As with the
Smith case, if considered solely within the privacy regime, courts
should protect autonomy by respecting and enforcing employee
consent. But here there are important interests outside of the
privacy regime that override this privacy interest. First, Congress
also sought to protect interests other than privacy when it enacted
the Employee Polygraph Protection Act. 99 Respect for those
interests and Congress's recognition of them overrides the interest in
employee privacy. Second, even if Congress thought it was
enacting the law solely to protect employee privacy, 1°° courts should
defer to the choice Congress made. Once again, the appropriate
analysis is to determine whether the outside interests are sufficient
to override the privacy interest at stake. When positive law limits
employee consent,' 01 the outside interests generally will override the
privacy interest at stake in part because of Congress's recognition of
those outside interests and in part because of appropriate deference
to another branch of government. But this should not be confused
with protection of employee privacy. Even when the legislature
95. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2009 (1988).
96. See Texas State Employees Union v. Texas Dept. of Mental Health &
Mental Retardation, 746 S.W.2d 203, 204 (Tex. 1987) (striking down state
agency polygraph policy in part because of intrusive control questions). Cf.
Soroka v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 1 Cal. Reptr. 2d 77 (1991) (striking down
employment test in part because of intrusive questions).
97. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2002, 2006(d). See Polkey v. Transtecs Corp., 404 F.3d
1264 (11 th Cir. 2005) (employer violated polygraph act by asking employee to
take test, even though she refused).
98. For circumstances in which employees may want to consent to
polygraph examinations, see Willbom, supra note 4, at 303.
99. See S. Rep. No. 100-284 (1988), reprintedin 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 726
(expressing concern over inaccuracy and unfairness of polygraph examinations).
100. Congress would be confused if it attempted to protect employee privacy
by prohibiting employees from consenting to privacy invasions, unless it
thought effective consent was impossible, see supra note 86, but Congressional
confusion alone would probably not be a sufficient ground to justify failure of
the courts to defer to a coordinate branch of government.
101. Congress could act solely to identify the point of social protection,
rather than both to identify that point and to limit employee consent. If
Congress acts only to identify the point of social protection, but then permits
employees to consent within the identified domain, Congress' action would not
conflict with the privacy regime and no balancing would be required.
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requires it, ignoring employee consent is inconsistent with
appropriate notions of privacy. But generally it is a justifiable
inconsistency.
The advantage of distinguishing between interests within and
outside the privacy regime is that it leads to conceptual clarity. The
privacy interest is recognized in law to protect the autonomy of
individuals. To claim that consent can be disregarded within the
privacy regime is inconsistent. On the other hand, to say that the
autonomy interest can be overridden by other factors, such as thirdparty interests or positive law, is perfectly appropriate. This is an
infringement on privacy, to be sure, but in appropriate
circumstances, it is a justified infringement. This conceptual
structure ensures that the privacy interest is recognized, evaluated,
and credited appropriately, even though it may be overridden at
times by outside interests.
E. Judging Consent
Given this approach to privacy, the precise framework for
assessing employee consent is crucial. Employee autonomy is the
central interest being protected by a privacy regime and,
consequently, consent is the primary issue in privacy cases after a
privacy interest has been identified. But, of course, determining
whether an employee has given valid consent is extremely difficult.
As I said at the beginning, everyone agrees that consent is a difficult
and compromised concept in employment law. 102
Recognizing this difficulty, courts should weigh three factors in
evaluating the validity of consent from employees: 10 3 a) the
102. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text. In a beautiful article,
Robert Gordon argues that employee consent simply cannot be evaluated by
examining the level of coercion, as I suggest here. Instead, employee consent is
respected, or not, for "moral, economic and political reasons independent of the
degree of coercion." Robert W. Gordon, Using History in Teaching Contracts:
The Case of Britton v. Turner, 26 U. Haw. L. Rev. 423, 433 (2004). 1have my
doubts about the analysis here, too. Again, this is a difficult problem. But the
value of this analysis is that it attempts to protect and enhance autonomy and
dignity by respecting the ability of employees to regulate their own level of
privacy.
103. I discuss here only one of the three elements required for a valid
consent: ability to make a meaningful choice. Westen, supra note 2, at 177245. I will not discuss the other two elements required for valid consent. First,
only competent employees can give a valid consent. Thus, issues may arise with
respect to who can give consent with respect to minors or people who are
incompetent because of limited emotional or cognitive capacity. For good
discussions in other contexts, see Alan Wertheimer, Consent to Sexual Relations
215-57 (2003); Joel Feinberg, supranote 12, at 316-43. Second, valid consent
can be given only with appropriate knowledge. For example, consent may not
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invasiveness of the privacy demand made by the employer, b) the
level of the employer's threat in making the demand, and c) the
employer's business interest in making the demand. 104
In evaluating employee consent, the level of the privacy
intrusion is one relevant factor.
Obviously, not all privacy
intrusions are created equal. Consider the following possibilities:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

A sexual relationship.
Requiring a drug test with direct observation of urination.
Requiring a blood test to check for HIV.
Hidden cameras in the lobby area.
An inappropriate hug by a supervisor.

be valid if an employer affirmatively misleads an employee about the
consequences of consenting. Westen, supra note 2, at 187-89. See NormanBloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, 135 F.3d 1260 (9th Cir. 1998)
(general consent to medical examination may not cover examination covering
highly private and sensitive medical and genetic information).
It is worth noting that, although these elements overlap significantly with
elements required to enter into a contract, they are not the same. See
Restatement
(Second) of Contracts §§ 9-16 (capacity),
159-73
(misrepresentation), 174-77 (duress and undue influence). For example, some
concepts central to contract, such as consideration, do not play a role at all here.
In addition, in contrast to contract law which begins with presumptive neutrality,
consent in privacy law arises only after a privacy interest has been identified
which allocates authority in a certain direction. For a discussion of similarities
and differences between consent and promises (contract), see Feinberg, supra
note 12, at 178.
Finally, I consider here only consent by individual employees. Consent
through unions or other agents is also an important issue but, once again, I do
not address it here. For interesting discussions, see Pauline T. Kim, Collective
and Individual Approaches to Protecting Employee Privacy: The Experience
with Workplace Drug Testing, 66 La. Law Rev. 1009 (2006); Stewart Schwab,
The Unions as Broker of Employment Rights (March 20, 2003) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Louisiana Law Review). See also Cramer v.
Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 255 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534
U.S. 1078, 122 S. Ct. 806 (2002) (privacy action is not preempted by federal
labor law because collective bargaining contract cannot be interpreted to provide
consent); McCoy v. Kretschmar, No. 88-4222, 1989 WL 145391 (9th Cir. 1989)
(unpublished opinion noted in table at 890 F.2d 420) (privacy claim fails
because consent to release information was provided through collective
bargaining agreement).
104. I am indebted to Joel Feinberg for thinking about employee consent in
this way, although I am talking about a different context than he was and I make
many changes because of the context. Fienberg, supra note 12, at 199-228.
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Because I am focusing on consent, I assume here that all of
these privacy invasions are sufficient to create a privacy interest: to
shift to the employee the right to consent or not to consent to the
invasion. I also assume (and claim) 10 5 that, if the employee has
validly consented, the consent would mean that there is no privacy
violation. But there are obvious differences in the degree of the
privacy invasion in these examples. An unconsented hug from a
supervisor is quite different than an unconsented sexual
relationship (which is generally referred to as a rape). Roughly
speaking, the items decrease in seriousness as you go down the list.
The claim here is that this factor is relevant to consent, but it is
relevant in a complicated way. On the one hand, because we
should expect consent to be granted more readily at the bottom of
the list, we should also be willing to credit vague consent there
more readily. I might consent to a hug without much thought or
much explicit consent; much more is required before I might
consent to a sexual relationship. Thus, for this reason, a court
should be much more willing to find consent at the bottom of the
list than the top, given exactly the same expression of consent. On
the other hand, assuming the same level of threat to induce
consent, the impact on the consent evaluation would cut in the
opposite direction. For example, assume that the threat is to refuse
your request for three days of vacation over Thanksgiving, unless
you consent to the privacy intrusion. This is a type of pressure to
be sure. But it is more likely to be undue pressure sufficient to
undermine consent at the bottom of the list than at the top. I am
quite unlikely to agree to an unwanted sexual relationship in return
for three days of vacation; I may well consent unwillingly to a hug
for that payment. On this, then, the implications cut the other way.
Any given level of threat is more likely to be coercive at the
bottom of the list than at the top.106
These two uses of the level of the privacy violation in
evaluating employee consent are not inconsistent. They are simply
different uses. The points here are a) that evaluating the level of
the privacy intrusion is an important part of evaluating whether the

105. With direct observation of urination, one might assert that that should be
a problem even if the employee consents. See Kelley v. Schlumberger, 849 F.2d
41 (1st Cir. 1988) (applying Louisiana law) (violation of right to privacy and
negligent infliction of emotional distress to observe urination directly). My
claim is that if the employee consents, there should not be a privacy claim
absent some consideration outside of the privacy regime which would override
that consent. See supra998-1001.
106. Joel Feinberg deals with this general concept in interesting and clever
ways. Feinberg, supra note 12, at 199-210.
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consent is valid and b) this factor must be considered in a
sophisticated fashion as it can cut in either direction.
A second factor to consider in evaluating employee consent is
the level of the employee's threat in making the demand. Consider
the following possibilities where the employer says consent or I
will take the following action:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Fire you from your long-time job.
Not hire you for an entry-level job.
Reduce your annual bonus by $5,000
Refuse your request for three days of vacation over
Thanksgiving.
5. Not greet you when you come to work in the morning.
This factor is also relevant to whether the employee had
sufficient freedom to exercise meaningful choice. Consent that is
the product of undue pressure is not valid consent because it does
not satisfy the interest in employee autonomy protected by privacy
law. But as with the level of the privacy intrusion, this is a
complicated factor that must be considered subtly. On the one
hand, as indicated above, some threats are so minor that they
would rarely compromise consent, especially as the level of the
privacy intrusion increases. 01 7 At the same time, even very serious
threats do not necessarily mean that voluntary consent has not
occurred. It is certainly possible that I would have had a sexual
relationship with you even if you had not threatened to fire me.
The threat to fire makes it less likely that my consent is voluntary,
but it certainly does not make it impossible.
Another complicating factor here is the possibility of coercive
offers. My list consists entirely of coercive threats, that is, unless
you do what I want I will make your life worse off beginning from
some baseline. Coercive offers are also possible, that is, if you
consent, I will do something to make your life better beginning
from that same baseline. All of the coercive threats listed above
can be converted with relative ease to coercive offers. For
example, if you consent, I will greet you with great enthusiasm
when you arrive for work every morning or I will agree to retain
you in your long-time job for the next fifteen years. And, of
course, there is no rule that says the situation cannot become even
more complicated by including both a coercive threat and a
coercive offer: if you consent, I will agree to retain you in your
long-time job for the next fifteen years, but if you refuse I will fire
you immediately. Intuitively, coercive offers seem to be less
107. See suprap. 1003.
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problematic than coercive threats. But I see no good reason for
that. In either case, consent may be compromised. 10 8 In either
case, a court's difficult job is to evaluate whether the consent is
sufficiently voluntary, even in the face of the positive or negative
coercion.
The third factor courts should consider in evaluating employee
consent is the employer's business interest in making the privacy
demand. On this factor, consider two possibilities:
1. An employer seeks drug
tests for customs agents involved
09
in drug interdiction.1
2. An employer places cameras in restrooms purely to satisfy
his prurient interests.
All other things being equal, the courts should be more willing
to find valid consent in the first situation than in the second.
Employees are more likely to consent when they can see an
important business interest than when that interest is absent. If
employees consent in both of these situations, courts should be
more willing to credit the consent in the first than in the second.
But again, I am only talking about consent here and, thus, the
employer's business interest is relevant only to that issue. If a
court finds that employees truly consent in the second situation,
protecting privacy requires that courts respect that consent,
regardless1 10of how distasteful or irrational the practice may seem to
the court.
The more difficult question here is whether it is really possible
to permit only such a limited role for the employer business
interest. Assume, for example, that an employee does not consent
in the first situation above, so the employer does not hire him.
This privacy demand was at a fairly high level (take a drug test)
108. There is considerable disagreement on this point, which I do not have
room to recount here. Compare,e.g., Hurd, supra note 14, at 144-45 (offers are
not coercive because they expand the set of choices available, even if all of them
are unattractive) with Joel Feinberg, supra note 12, at 229-68 (offers can be
coercive if offerer creates unattractive conditions). The principal point here is
that offers can be coercive under proper circumstances and, as with every other
factor, they must be evaluated carefully.
109. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656,
109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989).
110. It is conceivable, for example, that employees might consent to
videotaping in a restroom if necessary to apprehend the wrongdoer. Cf. Liberti
v. Walt Disney World Co., 912 F. Supp. 1494 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (denying
summary judgment for employer who allowed restroom videotapes to continue
in an attempt to apprehend the wrongdoer, but without notifying or obtaining
consent from those observed).
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and the threat in making the demand was high (denial of an entry
level job). But the employer's business interest is also high. Does
the employer really infringe on an employee's privacy by refusing
to hire in this situation? Considering only the consent stage of the
analysis (the only stage I focus on in this article), the answer must
be that, yes, there is a privacy violation.11' This is an infringement
of the employee's autonomy, which is precisely what privacy is
intended to protect. But there are at least two other steps in the
analysis. The consent issue only arises if the employee has a
privacy right that deserves protection. Although not the focus of
this article, it is possible that the employer's business interest may
play a more robust role at that earlier stage. It may be that when
111. This raises a symmetry question which I do not discuss fully here, and
that is not discussed in the privacy sections of the Restatement. Should there be
a difference between a situation where the employee suffers a privacy invasion
and then later sues and a situation such as the one in the text where the employee
refuses to consent and is then penalized? Some courts would say the employee
has a potential privacy claim in the first situation because a privacy violation has
actually occurred, but does not have a claim in the situation in the text because
there simply has not been any privacy invasion. See Everett v. Napper, 632 F.
Supp. 1481 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (no search under Fourth Amendment when
discharged employee refused to submit to drug test); Jennings v. Minco
Technology Labs, 765 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989) (no privacy invasion
for employee who refused to submit to drug test). But see Luck v. Southern Pac.
Transp. Co., 267 Cal. Rptr. 618 (Cal. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 939, 111
S. Ct. 344 (1990) (refusal to submit to drug test is a privacy right protected by
state constitution); Borse v. Piece Goods Shop, Inc. 963 F.2d 611 (3rd Cir.
1992) (discharge for refusal to submit to urinalysis screening and personal
property searches at workplace may state claim for wrongful discharge in
violation of public policy). Although I have not thought through this issue fully,
my intuition is that the distinction is untenable and that the two situations should
be treated the same.
This intuition for symmetry is supported by thinking about the two situations
through the prism of employee autonomy. Protection is necessary to safeguard
employee autonomy in situations where an employee refuses to consent and the
employer penalizes her, just as it is in situations where the employer improperly
invades the employee's privacy without proper consent. Both are threats to
employee autonomy. Thinking of situations like those in the text as a variety of
constructive discharge may be a useful starting point for analysis. See Martha
Chamallas, Title VII's Midlife Crisis:The Case of ConstructiveDischarge,77 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 307 (2004).
Elsewhere, the Restatement seems to be heading in this same general
direction. Section 4.02(c) would view a discharge for refusing to submit to a
privacy invasion as illegal retaliation in violation of public policy. Restatement
(Third) of Employment Law § 4.02(c) & comment e (Discussion Draft, 2006).
For reasons that are outside the scope of this paper, I would prefer a constructive
discharge approach, but the general intuition seems the same.
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employees encounter employers with such a strong business
interest, they fall on the wrong side of the line in Figure 1: the
employees may not have a privacy interest at all."" Similarly,
there is a stage of analysis after the consent stage. It may be that
the employer's business interest is sufficiently powerful that it
overrides the employee's privacy interest. As discussed above,
this result conflicts with the interest in employee autonomy that
privacy is intended to protect. But it does so because, in this case,
another important interest overrides it--the employer's powerful
business interest.'
This framework for evaluating employee consent is, of course,
a balancing test, so it has the problems of all balancing tests, such
as inconsistent application and lack of predictability. These
problems will be somewhat ameliorated in this context to the
extent that courts keep firmly in mind their role and, hence, their
purpose in evaluating these factors. Courts should consider these
factors only to determine whether an employee has given a valid
consent. If a court concludes that a party has given or withheld
valid consent, it does not matter how severe the privacy invasion or
how weak the employer's business interest. The court should
enforce the employee's decision. Even though courts will be
considering the level of invasion and the employer's business
interest, if they keep their role and this purpose firmly in mind, the
likelihood that privacy law will be used improperly to judge an
employer's business practices or to override an employee's own
choices about her privacy will be reduced.
112. Although not entirely clear, the best reading of the result in the Von
Raab case itself, 489 U.S. 656, 109 S. Ct. 1384, is probably that, for employees
directly involved with the interdiction of illegal drugs, the employer's strong
business interest means that they do not have a privacy interest at all. See also
Sheppard v. Beerman, 18 F.3d 147 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 816, 115 S.
Ct. 73 (1994) (law clerk has no privacy interest in materials within judge's
chambers, including materials in the clerk's own desk and file cabinets).
Interesting issues arise out of the interplay between these two stages of the
analysis. For example, in the situation in the text, the court could determine that
there is no privacy interest in the first place (which would make the consent
issue moot), or it could determine that there is a privacy interest, but because of
the circumstances employees gave constructive consent. See Westen, supra note
2, at 7-8 (discussing decision in Canada to treat assaults in hockey as assaults
with constructive consent, rather than as non-assaults). The issues of how to
determine the precise point of social protection of privacy and the interplay
between that determination and consent are not, however, the subject of this
article, so I will not discuss them further. The point here is that the consent
issue becomes salient only if a prior determination has been made that there is a
privacy interest in the first place.
113. See supra pp. 998-1001.
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Even with a clear sense of role and purpose, I know this is not
an overly satisfying approach to employee consent. Because there
are three factors that may cut in different directions and because
they are difficult and complicated to apply, this approach may not
always (or maybe even usually) yield clear answers. But I see no
good alternative. Again, employee consent in employment settings
is difficult and compromised. I think this proposal makes some
progress by parsing carefully the role of consent in privacy cases
and the relevant factors to consider in evaluating employee
consent. But at the end of the day, it is still a difficult task.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Heidi Hurd has said that consent has moral magic, and indeed
it does. The magic occurs because consent produces very
important legal transformations. As Hurd so elegantly puts it,
"consent turns a trespass into a dinner party, a battery into a
handshake, a theft into a gift, [and] an invasion of privacy into an
intimate moment."' 14 But with privacy, consent produces even
more magic: it empowers people to take control over important
aspects of their lives and, hence, in a very real sense, it creates
human dignity. Dignity is especially important in the workplace,
and doubly so in the non-unionized workplace, where threats to
dignity are omnipresent and powerful. The central point of this
article is that great care must be taken to ensure that consent can
continue to perform its moral magic in employment law.

114.

Hurd, supra note 14, at 123.

